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2Abstract
Innovation, creativity, and competition are some of the fundamental underlying forces driving
the advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI). This race for technological supremacy creates a
complex ecology of choices that may lead to negative consequences, in particular, when ethical
and safety procedures are underestimated or even ignored. Here we resort to a novel game the-
oretical framework to describe the ongoing AI bidding war, also allowing for the identification
of procedures on how to influence this race to achieve desirable outcomes. By exploring the
similarities between the ongoing competition in AI and evolutionary systems, we show that the
timelines in which AI supremacy can be achieved play a crucial role for the evolution of safety
prone behaviour and whether influencing procedures are required. When this supremacy can be
achieved in a short term (near AI), the significant advantage gained from winning a race leads
to the dominance of those who completely ignore the safety precautions to gain extra speed,
rendering of the presence of reciprocal behavior irrelevant. On the other hand, when such a
supremacy is a distant future, reciprocating on others’ safety behaviour provides in itself an
efficient solution, even when monitoring of unsafe development is hard. Our results suggest un-
der what conditions AI safety behaviour requires additional supporting procedures and provide
a basic framework to model them.
Keywords: AI race modelling, emergence, cooperation, evolutionary game theory.
31 Introduction
Interest in Artificial intelligence (AI) has exploded in academia and businesses in the last few
years. This excitement is, on one hand, due to a series of superhuman performances9,10,30,31
which have been exhibited. Although mostly successful in highly specialised tasks, exceed-
ing human ability and precision, these AI success stories appear often in the imagination of
the general public as Hollywood-like Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), able to perform a
broad set of intellectual tasks while continuously improving itself. Large scale surveys show
that AI researchers expect that AI systems will eventually reach and then exceed human-level
performance in many of the surveyed tasks, although the timelines are quite diverse16,32. On
the other hand, the excitement is promoted by business leaders as they anticipate important
gains from turning their previously idle data into active assets within business plans27. All
these (un)announced business and political ambitions indicate that an AI race or bidding war
has been triggered1,2,11, where stake-holders in private and public sectors are competing to be
the first to cross the finish line and hence the leader in the development and deployment of
powerful, transformative AI3,6,7,11.
Irrespectively of the anticipated benefits, many actors have urged for due diligence as i)
these AI systems can also be employed for more nefarious activities, e.g. espionage and cy-
berterrorism34 and ii) when trying to be the first/best then some ethical consequences as well
as safety procedures may be underestimated or even ignored3,11, notwithstanding the issue that
certain claims about achieving AGI may be overly optimistic or just oversold. These concerns
are highlighted by the many letters of scientists against the use of AI in military applications24,25
and the proclamations on ethical use of AI in the world12,28,33.
While potential AI disaster scenarios are many3,26,32, the uncertainties in accurately predict-
ing these risks and outcomes are high4. As insufficient data is available, the essential approach
4to clearly grasp what can be expected is to create models, i.e. dynamic descriptions of the
key features (of parts thereof) of this race in order to understand what outcomes are possible
under certain conditions and what crucial factors play an essential role. The Future of Life In-
stitute (FLI) as well as other similar institutes have therefore launched open calls for projects
to foster research on the topic of AI safety and the exploration of the AI race dynamics we are
currently witnessing. This manuscript provides a baseline model established within one of the
FLI awarded projects in 2018, discussing under what conditions unsafe versus safe AI develop-
ments may lead to disastrous outcomes, in races involving two or many more participants. This
baseline model resorts to the framework of evolutionary game theory18,29 to study the dynamics
and emergent behaviours within an AI development race.
Concretely, the model assumes that in order to achieve AI supremacy (AIS) in a domainX , a
number of development steps or rounds (W ) are required. Distinct values ofW capture different
regimes of AIS: in the limit of small W , AIS can be expected to happen in the near future (near
AIS regime) while when W is large, AIS will only be achieved far away in time (distant AIS
regime). Large-scale surveys and analysis of AI experts on their beliefs and predictions about
progress in AI suggest that the perceived timeline for AIS is highly diverse across domains and
regions4,16. Because this is a race, each participant acts by herself during each step in order to
reach the target and differs in the speed (s) with which they can complete each of the subtasks
at each round. A fast participant will, therefore, reap benefits (b) at each step, winning the
ultimate prize (B) once it carries out the final step achieving AIS in the domain X . If multiple
participants reach the end of intermediate steps or the final target at the same time they share the
benefits b and B. Yet, one can also assume that higher s also implies that some ethical/safety
procedures might be ignored. It takes time and effort to comply to precautionary requirements
or acquire ethical approvals. Following a safe development process is thus not only more costly
(c), it also results in a slower development speed. One can therefore consider that participants in
5the AI race that act safely (SAFE) pay a cost c > 0, which is not paid by participants that ignore
ethical/safety procedures (UNSAFE) and ii) the speed of development of UNSAFE participants
is faster (s > 1), compared to the speed of SAFE participants being normalised to s = 1. So
essentially a SAFE player needs W rounds to complete the task, whereas an UNSAFE player
will only need W/s. Yet, UNSAFE strategists may suffer a disaster, which is assumed here to
increase with the number of times the safety requirements have been skirted. The probability
that disaster occurs is denoted by pr and assumed to increase linearly with the frequency the
participant violates the safety precautions. For example, if a participant always plays SAFE
then pr = 0, while the participant that only follows it half of the time has a total probability
of pr/2 over all rounds. Moreover, if some sort of institutional or peer monitoring comes into
place, we assume that with some probability pfo those playing UNSAFE might be found out and
disclosed concerning their unsafe development and their products will therefore not be used,
leading to 0 benefit for the current round.
Let us consider a population of size Z in which players engage in a pairwise or N-player
race, where they can choose to consistently follow safety precautions (denoted by AS, the SAFE
players) or completely ignore them (denoted by AU, the UNSAFE players). Additionally, we
assume that, upon realising that UNSAFE players ignore safety precautions to gain a greater
development speed leading to the wining of the prize B (and a larger share of the intermediate
benefit in each round, b, especially in the regime of hard monitoring or low pfo), SAFE players
might adopt the same course of actions to avoid further disadvantage. It is indeed observed
that competing countries or companies might engage in such a safety-cutting corner behaviour
in deploying unsafe AI to avoid falling behind2. We therefore consider, in line with previous
literature of repeated games5,29, an alternative strategy (denoted by CS, the conditionally safe
strategy), which plays SAFE in the first round and then adopts the move its co-player used
in the previous round. This so-called direct reciprocity strategy has been shown to promote
6cooperation in the context of repeated social dilemmas, outperforming consistently defective
individuals5,29. In the following, we will examine, across different regimes of the AIS, under
which conditions (for instance, regarding the disaster probability), safety behaviour should to
be promoted or externally enforced. Similarly, we shall address when one should omit the
safety precautions for a larger social welfare and when the benefits gained in doing so exceeds
the disaster risk. Moreover, given the first-mover advantage of UNSAFE players in the race
to AI supremacy (i.e., acquire B), we will examine whether (and under what regime of the
AIS) conditional behaviours can still act as a promoting mechanism to achieve safety when
required, or otherwise other mechanisms are needed. For the sake of presentation, we start by
describing the pairwise race model and go on to describe the general N -player (N ≥ 2) race
results afterwards.
2 Results
We calculate the long-term frequency of each possible behavioural composition of the popula-
tion, the so-called stationary distribution (cf. Methods). The stochastic evolutionary dynamics
of the population occurs in the presence of errors, both in terms of errors of imitation and of be-
havioural mutations, the latter representing an open exploration of the possible strategies18,29.
Figure 1 shows the frequencies of the three strategies AS, AU and CS across a spectrum of
regimes of AIS: i) near AIS: in this regime, AIS will be achieved after a limited number of
development steps, making the ultimate prize of winning the race B highly significant (i.e.
B/W  b) ; ii) distant AIS (very large W ): in this regime, AIS will not be achieved in a
foreseeable future, making the ultimate prize of winning the race B insignificant compared to
the cost and benefit at each step of the race (i.e. B/W  b, c). We observe that in the near
AIS regime, AU dominates the population whenever the probability that an AI disaster occurs
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Figure 1. Different regimes of AIS: when W is small (near AIS) vs when W is large
(distant AIS). Panels (a) and (b) show the frequency of each strategy in a population of AS,
AU and CS (pr = 0.75). In the near AIS regime, AU dominates the population, while AS and
CS outperform AU in the distant AIS regime. This observation is valid for sufficiently small
pr, see panel (c) (pfo = 0.1). For a high risk probability of disaster occurring due to ignoring
safety precautions (high pr), AU has a low frequency in both regimes. Parameters: c = 1,
b = 4, W = 100, B = 10000, β = 0.01, population size, Z = 100.
due to unsafe development (pr) is not too high (Figure 1c; in panels a and b, pr = 0.75). In
the distant AI regime, all strategies are present in the population, where AS and CS are slightly
more frequent (Figure 1a-b). When an AI disaster is more likely to occur due to unsafe devel-
opments (i.e. large pr, see Figure 1c), AU has a low frequency in both regimes. Moreover, AU
frequency increases much more dramatically from high risk to low risk in the near AIS regime,
compared to the distant AIS one (cf. Figure S6 in SI for other values of pfo). It implies that
more efforts and care are needed in the near AIS regime, since that can dramatically change the
safety outcome of the race. Below we elaborate on each regime of AIS in greater detail.
Near AIS regime: speedy development overcomes the risk
First of all, we describe the conditions under which a population of individuals closely fol-
lowing safety precautions actually has a greater social welfare or average payoff than that of a
8population of players never following safety precautions, that is, when ΠAS,AS > ΠAU,AU . In
the near AIS regime, it is equivalent to (see SI for the proof)
pr > 1− 1
s
. (1)
That is, when the risk probability of AI disaster occurring due to the omission of safety precau-
tions is large enough compared to the gain of a greater development speed by doing so, safety
development is the preferred collective outcome for the population. On the other hand, when
this risk is shallow compared to the gain of omitting safety precautions, UNSAFE is the more
beneficial collective outcome. It would be detrimental however, to prevent this outcome from
emerging (i.e. over-regulation of AI development).
On the other hand, we found that both the safety complying strategies, AS and CS, are
preferred over AU by natural selection (i.e. see risk-dominance analysis in SI) when
pr > 1− 1
3s
. (2)
Thus, the two boundary conditions in Equations 1 and 2 divide the parameter space s-pr into
three regions, see Figure 2a: (I) when pr > 1 − 13s : safety development is both the preferred
collective outcome and selected by evolution (see Figure 2b for an example: for s = 1.5 the
condition becomes pr > 0.78); (II) when 1 − 13s > pr > 1 − 1s : although it is more desirable
to ensure safety development as the collective outcome, natural selection/social learning would
nevertheless drive the population to the state where safety precaution is mostly ignored (see
Figure 2c for an example: for s = 1.5 the condition becomes 0.78 > pr > 0.33); (III) when
pr < 1 − 1s , unsafe development is both the preferred collective outcome and the one selected
by evolution. Numerical results (cf. Methods) in Figure 2 confirm this division of the regions.
These observations are also robust for other intensities of selection, see Figure S4 (SI).
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Figure 2. Near AIG regime. (a) Frequency of AU as a function of the speed gained, s, and
the probability of AI disaster occurring, pr, when ignoring safety. In general, we observe that
when the risk probability is small, AU is dominant. The larger s is, AU dominates for a larger
range. Region (II): The two solid lines inside the plots indicate the boundaries
pr ∈ [1− 1/s, 1− 1/(3s)] where safety development is the preferred collective outcome but
unsafe development is selected by evolution. Regions (I) and (III) indicate where safe (resp.,
unsafe) development is both the preferred collective outcome and the one selected by
evolution. Panels (b) (pr = 0.9) and (c) (pr = 0.75): transition probabilities and stationary
distribution in a population of AS, AU, and CS, with s = 1.5. AU dominates in panel (c),
corresponding to region (II), while AS and CS dominate in panel (b), corresponding to region
(I). We only show the stronger directions. Parameters: c = 1, b = 4, W = 100, pfo = 0.5,
B = 10000, β = 0.01, population size, Z = 100.
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In regions (I) and (III), the preferred collective outcomes are selected by evolution. In the
latter, a significant speed gained by unsafe development actually compensates for the risk due
to ignoring safety precautions: taking risks (AI innovation) is better off because of high gain.
Region (II) is the most important one to study as additional mechanisms are needed to promote
safety behaviour against the unsafe one.
Note that the boundaries established in Equations 1 and 2 are applicable for both CS and
AS when playing against AU. Thus, similar results are obtained if we consider a population of
just two strategies AS and AU (cf. Figure S5 in SI). Adding CS does not change the overall
outcome and conditions for safety development to be selected.
In short, we have seen that in the near AIS regime, conditionally safe behaviours cannot
overcome the speedy development advantage gained by completely ignoring the safety precau-
tions. This points to the fact that external interference such as institution incentives need to be
established, in order to effectively regulate safety behaviour in this regime. Moreover, sufficient
care needs to be put in place to avoid over-regulation preventing a beneficial extra-speedy de-
velopment (in region (III)). It is noteworthy that our this result is robust when we consider the
AI race with among N teams (for all N ≥ 2, see SI). The main difference when increasing the
group size is that the upper bound of region (II) would increase. That is, unsafe behaviour is
selected by natural selection for a larger range of the parameter space s-pr. The reason is, the
larger the group size, the greater the chance that there is at least one AU player in the group
(with other AS and CS players), who would then win the development race.
11
      pfo   
   
  r
isk
 p
ro
ba
bil
ity
,  
p r
AU frequency
0
1
1.2ρN
AU
20%
AS
43%
CS
37%
1.7ρN
2.4ρN
AU
13%
AS
38%
CS
49%
1.3ρN
 pfo= 0.9  (b) (c)
(a)  pfo= 0.1 
Figure 3. Distant AIS regime. (a) Frequency of AU as a function of the probability of unsafe
development being found out, pfo , and the probability of AI disaster occurring pr, when the
number of development steps to reach AIS is very large (W = 106). AU has a low frequency
whenever pfo or pr are sufficiently high. (b-c): transition probabilities and stationary
distribution (pr = 0.75). Against AU, AS performs better than CS when pfo is large, which is
reversed when pfo is small. Parameters: c = 1, b = 4, s = 1.5, B = 10000, β = 0.01,
population size, Z = 100.
Distant AIS regime: conditional behaviour prevails even under weak mon-
itoring
When AIS is unachievable in the short term, the effect of increasing pr (from low to high risk)
on the frequency of safe and unsafe behaviours is less dramatic than in the near AIS regime,
see Figure 3. In general, all strategies are present, where the frequency of AU decreases as a
function of pfo and pr. In contrast to the near AIS regime, the conditionally safe strategy, CS,
contributes significantly to enhancing the safety behaviour outcome. Indeed, CS outperforms
AS when the probability of uncovering an unsafe development in each round pfo is small (which
is is reversed for larger pfo) (see Figure 1a-b; also Figure S3 in SI). That is, when monitoring
of unsafe development is highly efficient (i.e. large pfo), it is best to follow closely the safety
precautions to avoid AI disaster by all means, even when facing unsafe opponents. However,
when this monitoring is not efficient, acting conditionally provides the more efficient solution to
12
prevent unsafe behaviour as it can avoid being disadvantageous after the first round. These ob-
servations can also be studied analytically (see SI). Namely, we derive conditions under which
AS and CS are selected over AU by natural selection, as well as when safety behaviour is the
preferred collective outcome than the unsafe one (cf. Figure S1). For a greater efficiency of
monitoring (the larger pfo) or a lower speed gained by omitting safety precaution (the smaller
s), we show that a lower threshold for the disaster risk pr is required for those conditions to
hold. Moreover, this threshold for AS is higher than that for CS when pfo is small, which is
reversed when it is large. As shown in the SI, all these observations remain valid if, instead of
pairwise interactions, we consider a general N -team AI race.
3 Discussion
Our results suggest that it is significantly more challenging to achieve safety behaviour in the
regime where AI supremacy is achievable within a limited number of development steps (near
AIS) than when it is only feasible at a distant future (distant AIS). In the former regime, the
extra development speed gained by ignoring safety precautions gives the unsafe players the
first-mover advantage that could not be overcome by a conditionally safe strategy (CS). To
the contrary, in the latter regime, such a conditional strategy provides an efficient pathway to
achieve safety behavior, especially when the monitoring of unsafe development is difficult.
Our results thus point out that it is essential to provide in the near AIS regime the necessary
supporting mechanisms (such as suitable rewards and sanctions)17,32 to control the speed of
AI development of rogue teams, in order to drive the AI development dynamics towards more
beneficial directions and outcomes. Without such mechanisms, the unconditional unsafe players
(AU) would always win the race against any other strategies that play SAFE at any development
round (such as CS players in our analysis, which only does so only in the first round), achieving
13
a significant payoff advantage. On the other hand, in the distant AIS regime, because reciprocal
behaviour by itself is sufficient to ensure high levels of beneficial safe behaviour, less effort
would be needed to ensure sustainable AI systems. This observation is in line with the response
to the risk of AGI by many researchers that ’no action needed’ because AGI development will
take a long time or will not be possible at all8,13 (see also a survey of responses in ref.32).
Moreover, our results imply that by advertising that AGI is about to arrive might lead to an
acceleration of the AI race, and to a decrease of safety precautions. In other words, our results
thus support the argument that the rhetoric and framing of the AI development race and how
close it is to achieve the AGI might strongly influence the dynamics and outcome of the AI
race6,11.
In the current models we assume that an AI disaster might occur only when a true AI or AGI
has been achieved, i.e. after the W development steps have been completed. However, it might
be the case that some smaller scaled disasters might occur before that milestone, especially
when it is not clear whether and when AGI will or has been be achieved, and there might even
be false beliefs regarding its presence. What is more, parties may release over simplistic AI but
deliberatively advertise more than it can achieve, thereby leading to unforeseen usage disasters.
We will analyse these scenarios in future works.
Last but not least, it is noteworthy that despite focusing on AI development race in this
paper, our results are generally applicable to any kind of racing situations such as technological
innovation problems where there is a significant advantage to be achieved when reaching a
target first.
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4 Methods
AI race model definition. The AI development race is modeled as a repeated two-player
game, consisting ofW development rounds. In each round, the players can collect benefits from
their intermediate AI products, depending on whether they choose to play SAFE or UNSAFE.
Assuming a fixed benefit, b, from the AI market, teams will share this benefit proportionally
to their development speed. Moreover, we assume that with some probability pfo those playing
UNSAFE might be found out about their unsafe development and their products won’t be used,
leading to 0 benefit. Thus, in each round of the race, we can write the payoff matrix as follows
(with respect to the row player)
pi =

SAFE UNSAFE
SAFE −c+ b2 −c+ (1− pfo) bs+1 + pfob
UNSAFE (1− pfo) sbs+1 (1− p2fo) b2
. (3)
For instance, when two SAFE players interact, each needs to pay the cost c and they share the
benefit b. When a SAFE player interacts with an UNSAFE one the SAFE player pays a cost c
and obtains the full benefit b in case the UNSAFE co-player is found out (with probability pfo),
and obtains a small part of the benefit b/(s+ 1) otherwise (i.e. with probability 1− pfo). When
playing with a SAFE player, the UNSAFE does not have to pay any cost and obtains a larger
share bs/(s + 1) when not found out. Finally, when an UNSAFE player interacts with another
UNSAFE, it obtains the shared benefit b/2 when both are not found out and the full benefit b
when it is not found out while the co-player is found out, and 0 otherwise. The payoff is thus:
(1 − pfo) [(1− pfo)(b/2) + pfob] = (1 − p2fo) b2 . The payoff matrix defining averaged payoffs
15
for the three strategies reads
Π =

AS AU CS
AS B2W + pi11 pi12
B
2W + pi11
AU (1− pr)
(
sB
W + pi21
)
(1− pr)
(
sB
2W + pi22
)
(1− pr)
[
sB
W +
s
W
(
pi21 + (
W
s − 1)pi22
)]
CS B2W + pi11
s
W
(
pi12 + (
W
s − 1)pi22
)
B
2W + pi11
.
(4)
Evolutionary Dynamics in Finite Populations. We adopt here Evolutionary Game The-
ory (EGT) methods for finite populations to derive analytical results and numerical observa-
tions19,22,23. In a repeated games, players’ average payoff over all the game rounds (see the
payoff matrix in Equation 4) represents their fitness or social success, and evolutionary dy-
namics is shaped by social learning18,29, whereby the most successful players will tend to be
imitated more often by the other players. In the current work, social learning is modeled us-
ing the so-called pairwise comparison rule35, assuming that a player A with fitness fA adopts
the strategy of another player B with fitness fB with probability given by the Fermi function,(
1 + e−β(fB−fA)
)−1, where β conveniently describes the selection intensity (β = 0 represents
neutral drift while β →∞ represents increasingly deterministic selection). For convenience of
numerical computations, but without affecting analytical results, we assume here small muta-
tion limit14,19,23. As such, at most two strategies are present in the population simultaneously,
and the behavioural dynamics can thus be described by a Markov Chain, where each state rep-
resents a homogeneous population and the transition probabilities between any two states are
given by the fixation probability of a single mutant14,19,23. The resulting Markov Chain has a
stationary distribution, which describes the average time the population spends in an end state.
In two-player game, the average payoffs in a population of k A players and (Z − k) B players
16
can be given as below (recall that Z is the population size), respectively,
PA(k) =
(k − 1)ΠA,A + (Z − k)ΠA,B
Z − 1 , PB(k) =
kΠB,A + (Z − k − 1)ΠB,B
Z − 1 . (5)
The fixation probability that a single mutant A taking over a whole population with (Z − 1) B
players is as follows21,23,35
ρB,A =
(
1 +
Z−1∑
i=1
i∏
j=1
T−(j)
T+(j)
)−1
, (6)
where T±(k) = Z−k
Z
k
Z
[
1 + e∓β[PA(k)−PB(k)]
]−1 describes the probability to change the number
of A players by ± one in a time step. Specifically, when β = 0, ρB,A = 1/Z, representing the
transition probability at neural limit.
Having obtained the fixation probabilities between any two states of a Markov chain, we
can now describe its stationary distribution14,19. Namely, considering a set of s strategies,
{1, ..., s}, their stationary distribution is given by the normalised eigenvector associated with
the eigenvalue 1 of the transposed of a matrix M = {Tij}si,j=1, where Tij,j 6=i = ρji/(s− 1) and
Tii = 1−
∑s
j=1,j 6=i Tij .
Risk-dominant conditions. We can determine which selection direction is more probable: an
A mutant fixating in a homogeneous population of individuals playing B or a B mutant fixating
in a homogeneous population of individuals playing A. When the first is more likely than the
latter, A is said to be risk-dominant against B15,20, which holds for any intensity of selection
and in the limit of large N when
piA,A + piA,B > piB,A + piB,B. (7)
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21 Deriving conditions for viability of safety behaviour1
1.1 When safety behaviour is the preferred collective outcome2
We derive analytical condition for which a population of players always following safety pre-3
cautions has a greater social welfare or average payoff than that of a population of players never4
following safety precautions, that is, ΠAS,AS > ΠAU,AU :5
B
2W
+ pi11 > (1− pr)
(
sB
2W
+ pi21
)
. (1)
Following the definitions of different AIS regimes in the main texts, we simplify this condition6
for the two regimes. First, in the near AI regime where B/W  b, Equation 1 is equivalent to7
8
pr > 1− 1
s
. (2)
Now, in the distant AIS regime where W →∞ (i.e. B/W  c), Equation 1 is equivalent to:9
pi11 > (1− pr)pi21. (3)
which is equivalent to10
pfo > 1− (b− 2c)(s+ 1)
2sb(1− pr) . (4)
or equivalently11
pr > 1− (b− 2c)(s+ 1)
2sb(1− pfo) . (5)
31.2 When safety behaviour is selected by evolution12
We now derive conditions for which AS and CS are risk-dominant against AU, which are the13
case if and only if, respectively,14
B
2W
+ pi11 + pi12 > (1− pr)
(
3sB
2W
+ pi21 + pi22
)
. (6)
15
s
W
(
pi12 + (
W
s
− 1)pi22
)
+
B
2W
+pi11 > (1−pr)
[
sB
2W
+
sB
W
+
s
W
(
pi21 + (
W
s
− 1)pi22
)
+ pi22
]
.
(7)
In the near AI regime where B/W  b, both equations are simplified to16
pr > 1− 1
3s
. (8)
On the other hand, in the distant AIS regime where W → ∞ (i.e. B/W  c), they are17
simplified to, respectively18
pi11 + pi12 > (1− pr)(pi21 + pi22). (9)
19
pi11 > (1− 2pr)pi22. (10)
which are equivalent to, respectively20
pr >
4c(1 + s)− b (2 + p2fo + (−2 + pfo(4 + pfo))s)
b(1− pfo)(1 + pfo + (3 + pfo)s) (11)
4pr >
1
2
− b− 2c
2b(1− p2fo)
. (12)
Thus, for safety behaviour to be both selected and the preferred outcome, all the pr must satisfy21
all the Eqs (12), (11) and (5).22
It is clear to see that the left hand sides of Eqs (12) and (5) are decreasing functions of pfo
whenever b ≥ 2c. We now show that it is also the case for the left hand side of Eq 11. Indeed,
its first order derivative by pfo gives
−2(1 + s)
[
b
(
4s+ p2fos+ pfo(3 + s)
)− 4c(pfo + s+ pfos)]
b(1− pfo)2(1 + pfo + 3s+ pfos)2
which is negative whenever b ≥ 2c because
(
4s+ p2fos+ pfo(3 + s)
)− 2(pfo + s+ pfos) = 2s+ p2fos+ p− pfos > 0
In short, we have shown that for b ≥ c, the larger pfo the easier the conditions for the safety23
behaviour to be both selected and the preferred outcome. Figure S1 validates these observations24
numerically. Similarly, we also can show that these conditions are harder to achieve the larger25
s is.26
Thus, the hardest conditions are obtained when pfo = 0, which is equivalent to27
pr > max{1− (b− 2c)(s+ 1)
2sb
,
4c(s+ 1) + 2b(s− 1)
b(1 + 3s)
,
c
b
}}. (13)
It is easily seen that the right hand side is greater than 1 iff b < 2c, i.e. this condition would28
not be achieved (since pr ≤ 1) in that case. Assuming b ≥ 2c, since 4c(s+1)+2b(s−1)b(1+3s) > 1 −29
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Figure S1. Distant AIS regime (W = 106). The lines (panel a) and curves (panel c) indicate
the conditions above which safety behavior is the preferred collective outcome (black ones)
and when AS and CS are risk-dominant against AU (green and blue ones, respectively). The
threshold for AS is greater than than CS when pfo is small, which is reversed when pfo is large.
(b-d) Frequency of AU as a function of pr and pfo (panel b; s = 1.5) or s (panel d; pfo = 0),
respectively. Parameters: c = 1, b = 4, B = 10000, β = 0.01, population size, Z = 100.
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Figure S2. Distant AGI regime. Frequency of AU when there is no monitoring (pfo = 0), for
varying pr and s, for β = 0.01 (left panel) and β = 0.1 (right panel). The solid lines indicate
the conditions for varying pfo, so that if pr is above the lines safety behavior is the preferred
collective outcome (black line), AS and CS are risk-dominant against AU (green and blue
lines, respectively). When there is no monitoring or weak monitoring, CS is more efficient
than AS in dealing with AU (green line is always below blue line). Parameters: c = 1, b = 4,
B = 10000, W = 106, population size, Z = 100.
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Figure S3. Distant AIS regime. Frequency of AU, AS and CS as a function of the probability
of unsafe development being found out, pfo , and the probability of AI disaster occurring pr,
when the number of development steps to reach AIS is very large (W = 106). AU has a low
frequency whenever pfo or pr are sufficiently high. AS performs best when pfo is large.
Parameters: c = 1, b = 4, s = 1.5, B = 10000, β = 0.01, population size, Z = 100.
(b−2c)(s+1)
2sb
> c
b
, it can be further simplified to30
pr >
4c(s+ 1) + 2b(s− 1)
b(1 + 3s)
(14)
which is the condition for AS to be risk-dominant against AU (see Figure S1 for an example31
when s = 1.5).32
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Figure S4. Frequency of AU in a population of three strategies, AS, AU, and CS, as a
function of the speed gained when ignoring safety, s, and the the risk probability pr. In
general, we observe that when the risk probability is small, AU is dominant. Also, the larger B
and s, AU dominates for a larger range. The two solid lines inside the plots indicate the
boundaries pr ∈ [1− 1/(3s), 1− 1/s] where safety development is preferred but non-safety
development is preferable (risk-dominant against CS and AS). The observations are valid for
varying the selection intensities: β = 0.001, 0.01, 0.1 for panels (a), (b) and (c), respectively.
Other parameters: c = 1, b = 4, W = 100, pfo = 0.5, B = 10000, population size, Z = 100.
2 Multiplayer AI race33
In this section we describe the N-team model of the AI race, extending the two-team model in34
the main text. We then describe the Methods used for analysing multi-player games.35
2.1 N-player AI Race definition36
The AI development race is modeled as a repeated N -player game, consisting of W develop-37
ment rounds. In each round, the players can collect benefits from their intermediate AI products,38
depending on whether they choose to play SAFE or UNSAFE. Assuming a fixed benefit, b, from39
the AI market, teams will share this benefit proportionally to their development speed. More-40
over, we assume that with some probability pfo those playing UNSAFE might be found out41
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Figure S5. Frequency of AU in a population of two strategies, AS and AU, as a function of
the speed gained when ignoring safety, s, and the the risk probability pr. In general, we
observe that when the risk probability is small, AU is dominant. Also, the larger B and s, AU
dominates for a larger range. The two solid lines inside the plots indicate the boundaries
pr ∈ [1− 1/(3s), 1− 1/s] where safety development is preferred but non-safety development
is preferable (risk-dominant against CS and AS). The observations are valid for varying the
selection intensities: β = 0.001, 0.01, 0.1 for panels (a), (b) and (c), respectively. Other
parameters: c = 1, b = 4, W = 100, pfo = 0.5, B = 10000, population size, Z = 100.
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(distant AIS). Frequency of AU for different pfo. Parameters: c = 1, b = 4, W = 100,
B = 10000, β = 0.01, population size, Z = 100.
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1about their unsafe development and their products won’t be used, leading to 0 benefit.42
In a group of where k players choosing SAFE and (N − k) choosing UNSAFE, the payoffs43
for players adopting SAFE and UNSAFE in each round of the race are, respectively44
pi(k)SAFE =

−c+ (1− pfo) bk+s(N−k) + pfo bk if 1 ≤ k < N
c+ b
N
if k = N
pi(k)UNSAFE = (1− pfo) sb
k + s(N − k) for 0 ≤ k < N
We consider a well-mixed, finite population of size Z, where players repeatedly interact45
with each other in the AI development process, using one of the following three strategies :46
• AS (always complies with safety precaution)47
• AU (never complies with safety precaution)48
• CS (conditionally safe, plays SAFE in the first round; then plays SAFE if everyone in the49
group plays SAFE in the previous round and plays UNSAFE otherwise)50
The average payoffs for the repeated games (k denotes the number of AS or CS when playing51
with AU)52
ΠAS,AU(k) =

pi(k)SAFE if 1 ≤ k < N
B
NW
+ pi(k)SAFE if k = N
ΠAU,AS(k) = p
(
sB
W (N − k) + pi(k)UNSAFE
)
for 0 ≤ k < N
1For simplicity of calculation, we assume that all the UNSAFE players will be found out or not together, e.g.
whenever investigation is done then they are found out; otherwise they are not.
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Figure S7. Different regimes of AGI: near AI (small W ) vs distant AGI (large W ).
Frequency of AS, AU and CS in a population of the three strategies in co-presence. Other
parameters: c = 1, b = 4, W = 100, s = 1.5, pr = 0.75, B = 10000, N = 5, Z = 100,
β = 0.1.
ΠCS,AU(k) =

s
W
(
pi(k)SAFE + (
W
s
− 1)pi(0)UNSAFE
)
if 1 ≤ k < N
B
NW
+ pi(k)SAFE if k = N
ΠAU,CS(k) = p
[
sB
W (N − k) +
s
W
(
pi(k)UNSAFE + (
W
s
− 1)pi(0)UNSAFE
)]
for 0 ≤ k < N
2.2 Evolutionary dynamics for different AIS regimes in multiplayer game53
In Figures S8 and S7 we show that the results for multi-player games are qualitatively the same54
as in two-player game, across different regimes of AIS (i.e. varying W ).55
2.3 Near AIS regime: multiplayer games conditions56
Condition for ΠAS,AU(N) > ΠAU,AU(0), ensuring that a population of players always following
safety precautions has a greater social welfare or average payoff than that of a population of
12
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Figure S8. Different regimes of AGI: near AI (small W ) vs distant AGI (large W ).
Frequency AU in a population of the three strategies AS, AU and CS in co-presence, as a
function of pr and W . Other parameters: c = 1, b = 4, W = 100, s = 1.5, pr = 0.75,
B = 10000, N = 5, Z = 100, β = 0.1.
13
players never following safety precautions:
B
NW
+ pi(N)SAFE > (1− pr)
(
sB
NW
+ pi(0)UNSAFE
)
.
Assuming that B  b, it is equivalent to:57
pr > 1− 1
s
. (15)
On the other hand, AS is risk-dominant against both AU iff58
N−1∑
k=0
pi(k)AU,AS <
N∑
k=1
pi(k)AS,AU (16)
For B  b, it is equivalent to59
pr > 1− 1
(NHN)s
. (17)
where HN =
∑N
i=1 1/i. The same condition is obtained for CS to be risk-dominant against AU.60
Thus, the two boundary conditions in Equations 15 and 17 divide the parameter space s-pr61
into three regions, see Figure S9a: (I) when pr > 1 − 1(NHN )s : safety development is both the62
preferred collective outcome and selected by evolution (see Figure S9b for an example: for63
s = 1.5 the condition becomes pr > 0.94); (II) when 1− 1(NHN )s > pr > 1− 1s : although it is64
more desirable to ensure safety development as the collective outcome, natural selection/social65
learning would drive the population to the state where safety precaution is mostly ignored (see66
Figure S9c for an example: for s = 1.5 the condition becomes 0.94 > pr > 0.33); (III)67
when pr < 1 − 1s , unsafe development is both the preferred collective outcome and selected68
by evolution. Numerical results (cf. Methods below) in Figure S9 confirm this division of the69
regions.70
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s = 1.5, pfo = 0.5, B = 10000, Z = 100.
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We observed that, the larger s is, the greater the threshold for pr. Moreover, a larger group71
size leads to a larger region (II) – AU is selected for a larger range of the parameter space s-pr.72
The reason is that, the larger the group size, the greater the chance that there is at least one AU73
player in the group (with other AS/CS players), who would win the development race.74
2.4 Methods: Payoffs over group samplings75
In finite populations, the groups engaging in a N-player game are given by multivariate hyper-
geometric sampling. For transition between two pure states (small mutation), this reduces to
sampling (without replacement) from a hypergeometric distribution2,4. Namely, in a population
of size Z with x individuals of type i and Z − x individuals of type j, the probability to select
k individuals of type i and N − k individuals of type j in N trials is2
H(k,N, x, Z) =
(
x
k
)(
Z − x
N − k
)
(
Z
N
) .
Recall that Πij(k) and Πji(k) (see the section above) denote the payoff of a strategist of type i76
and j, respectively, when the random sampling consists of k players of type i and N−k players77
of type j (as derived above). Hence, in a population of x i-strategists and (Z − x) j-strategists,78
16
the average payoffs to i and j strategists are2,4:79
Pij(x) =
N−1∑
k=0
H(k,N − 1, x− 1, Z − 1) Πij(k + 1)
=
N−1∑
k=0
(
x− 1
k
)(
Z − x
N − 1− k
)
(
Z − 1
N − 1
) Πij(k + 1),
Pji(x) =
N−1∑
k=0
H(k,N − 1, x, Z − 1) Πji(k)
=
N−1∑
k=0
(
x
k
)(
Z − 1− x
N − 1− k
)
(
Z − 1
N − 1
) Πji(k).
(18)
Now, the probability to change the number k of agents using strategy i by ±1 in each time step80
can be written as81
T±(k) =
Z − k
Z
k
Z
[
1 + e∓β[Pij(k)−Pji(k)]
]−1
, (19)
with T+ corresponding to an increase from k tot k + 1 and T− corresponding to the opposite.82
Fixation probability and stationary distribution are calculated in the same way as in two-83
player games.84
Risk-dominance condition85
An important analytical criteria to determine the evolutionary viability of a given strategy is86
whether it is risk-dominant with respect to other strategies1,3. Namely, one considers which87
selection direction is more probable: an i mutant fixating in a homogeneous population of88
agents playing j or a j mutant fixating in a homogeneous population of agents playing i. When89
the first is more likely than the latter, i is said to be risk-dominant against j 1, which holds for90
17
any intensity of selection and in the limit of large population size Z when91
N∑
k=1
Πij(k) ≥
N−1∑
k=0
Πji(k). (20)
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